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"THE GOVERNMENT
 IS THE SERVANT
 OF THE PEOPLE
 AND NOT ITS MASTER"

Winston Churchill
Oslo 1948

Reforming Parliament

By C.E.S. Franks

February 2003

Proposals to reform Parliament divide into two groups: those that tinker with the present system; and those that would change the system itself.  The former involves minor incremental reforms, the latter more profound revisions to the processes of representation and structure of power in the national government.  In political science terms, incremental reforms would not change the “majoritarian” (I prefer the word “adversarial”) nature of the Canadian parliamentary system.  Fundamental reform, in contrast, would make the system less adversarial, and more consensual.  The two kinds of reform are not mutually exclusive, but they embrace fundamentally different approaches.  Political scientists have found consensual systems to be better suited than majoritarian ones to successful governance and unity in large, geographically and culturally diverse countries like Canada.

           
Free votes and stronger committees lead the list of incremental parliamentary reforms.  But although greater independence for individual MPs has been proposed by all parties and even promised by governments, party discipline has retained its rigidity in Canada, even though it has weakened in other parliamentary democracies.  In Canada power lies with the parties and party leadership, not the individual members.  The electorate votes overwhelmingly on the basis of party and party leadership. The percentage voting for a particular candidate rather than for party or leader is minuscule and irrelevant to electoral outcome in most constituencies.  The media view exacerbate the already strong tendency of party leadership to demand adherence to party line because they treat dissent by members as proof of weakness.

Starting with the Diefenbaker government, many efforts have been made to improve the generally dismal performance of parliamentary committees.  But the intentions of reformers have invariably been frustrated.  It has been found that the sources of problems in committees lie outside what Parliament itself can change in committee composition, powers, and procedures.  The short parliamentary careers of members, rigid party lines, and government domination in our executive-centred system impose the true limits to reform of committees.

If the intention is to make serious change, then reform must deal with the roots of the problems, not the consequences.  It must lead towards a more consensual system.  Proportional representation heads the list of these sorts of fundamental reforms.  Its advantages include a House of Commons that would more accurately reflect the voting patterns of the electorate and the varieties of opinion within each province, which would give minorities in provinces and regions a voice which they now lack.  A system of proportional representation would lead to longer-serving members of Parliament.  Its disadvantages include likelihood of more parties in the house and more minority parliaments, though these effects can be moderated by, for example, requiring a party to gain at least five percent of the national vote before it is entitled to representation in Parliament, and by creating an appropriate balance between MPs elected from the current system of geographical constituencies and MPs selected through proportional representation.

The second major reform towards a more consensual system would be to strengthen the Senate by defining its role more clearly and improving the process for selecting senators.  The present practice of making appointments to the Senate solely on the basis of the recommendation of the prime minister enjoys little support outside the prime minister’s office, and weakens the influence of senators (who on average have had more distinguished careers and more political experience than members of Parliament).  When and how the Senate can and should defy the Commons needs to be clarified.  A package for Senate reform would include clear procedural definitions of the circumstances and procedures under which the Senate can defeat or delay ordinary legislation, and a better way for appointing senators, such as from lists established by province-wide elections.

At present more than twenty-five percent of government bills fail to pass through Parliament and gain royal assent.  Fifty years ago the failure rate for government bills was less than five percent.  Regardless of the reasons for this steady drop (and they are many and complex), the present failure rate does show that Canadian governments can survive and continue to govern successfully despite failure of a high proportion of their legislative initiatives.

A more consensual system would take some power away from the prime minister and cabinet, but other parts of the political system would gain, including the House of Commons, the individual member of Parliament, committees, the reformed Senate, public discussion and the variety of interests attempting to influence government policy.  Despite what defenders of the present system claim, this would not mean the end of responsible government.  The conventions on confidence are flexible, and governments can continue to govern though they lose votes in the House, or must cope with more powerful and independent committees.

A move towards a more consensual parliamentary-cabinet system would create better ways for Canada to discuss and resolve problems.  It would not involve frightening steps that have never been tried before.  Proportional representation has been adopted by New Zealand.  Australia has an elected upper chamber.  British MPs have far more independence than Canadian.  A more consensual system would encourage the desired minor incremental reforms to our parliamentary system - loosening party discipline and making committees more independent and effective.  Greater legitimacy for the Senate would allow the very good work done by its committees to be more influential.

A more consensual system would give greater legitimacy to Parliament and its members.  This in turn would strengthen other national institutions.  Incremental reforms by themselves will not succeed, and their failure will only reinforce the views of those who despair for the present system, including the many Canadians who do not like the confrontational, adversarial nature of present parliamentary politics.  In reforming Parliament what might appear the riskier course will in reality prove to be the safer.

 C.E.S. Franks is professor emeritus of political science at Queen's University.