The Linchpin?
Canada-US relations - through the lens of
history
By John Plumpton
Volume
18 Issue 1 Spring 2006
During times like these, when Canada and
the United States disagree over everything from lumber and beef to
missile shields and border screenings, it may be difficult to remember
"The Linchpin" role that Canada played on the international
stage during much darker days.
But with so much in common and so much at
stake - including more than $1-billion a day of trade - it is in both
countries' interest to look back on all we have accomplished together
and to renew our relationship.
Polls show that "Uncle Sam,"
especially under the administration of George W. Bush, is no longer
Canada's favourite uncle. At the same time, comments in Washington
indicate they don't much care for the policies - or some of the more
outspoken anti-American politicians -- in Ottawa.
The occasional tensions that any
neighbours experience were dramatically heightened in the days and
months following Sept. 11, 2001. Many Canadians were aghast when
President Bush, speaking to Congress just days after the 9/11 attacks
with British Prime Minister Tony Blair present, called Britain
"America's best friend" and made no reference to its
long-standing and sympathetic neighbour to the north.
The acrimony grew when Ottawa refused,
with strong public support, to join the "coalition of the
willing" to overthrow Saddam Hussein, and the two countries
disagreed on a multi-national vs. unilateral approach to combating
terrorism.
The cozy "special relationship"
between Britain and the U.S., totally by-passing Canada, was not always
the case. Not too long ago, when Britain faced the Nazi threat with only
her Empire and Commonwealth allies beside her, she needed the
"senior dominion" - Canada -- to help garner American support.
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill,
recognizing the potential of Canada's unique relationship with both the
United States and the Great Britain, dubbed her "the linchpin of
the English-speaking peoples" and "the master link in
Anglo-American unity."
The special relationship that eventually
developed between Britain and the United States was originally a
personal connection between Churchill and U.S. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt.
In September 1939, the American President
wrote Churchill, then the newly-appointed First Lord of the Admiralty,
that he would be glad to receive a personal message from him on any
matter that Churchill wished to communicate. Thus began an exchange of
correspondence in which Canada would soon play a significant role.
By the time Churchill had become Prime
Minister in May 1940 there were a dozen communications between the two
leaders. The "special relationship" had been born but its
growth periodically required the linchpin. One of those times may have
changed history.
On May 20, 1940, a desperate Churchill
informed Roosevelt that "if members of the present administration
were finished and others came in to parley amid the ruins, you must not
be bland to the fact the sole remaining bargaining counter with Germany
would be the fleet; and if this country were left by the United States
to its fate no one would have the right to blame those then responsible
if they made the best terms they could for the surviving
inhabitants."
Roosevelt recognized the gravity of the
situation but, despite their other correspondence, there is no record of
a direct response to Churchill's warning. The U.S. was in the midst of
an extreme isolationist period and Roosevelt was preparing for an
unprecedented third election later that year.
Instead of responding directly to
Churchill, the American president used a Canadian External Affairs
official, Hugh Keenleyside, to convey an important message to Churchill,
via Canada's Prime Minister Mackenzie King.
Roosevelt sent a message to Churchill
that the British fleet must not be surrendered. In the event of a
successful German invasion, the fleet must be transferred to the
Dominions or destroyed. There must be no "soft" peace with the
Nazis, he said. In return, Roosevelt would push international law to the
limit to support the British fleet and defend Allied possessions.
The Americans wanted Mackenzie King to
make the message appear to come from him while also making apparent the
real source. After much vacillation, Mackenzie King conveyed the
message, but he clearly attributed it to President Roosevelt.
Four days later, Winston Churchill
delivered one of his most memorable speeches in the House of Commons
which concluded with "we shall fight in the fields and in the
streets…we shall never surrender" and promised that "the
Empire, armed and guarded by the British fleet would carry on the
struggle until, in God's good time, the New World [read United States],
with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the
liberation of the old."
Upon hearing that speech, Mackenzie King
recorded in his diary: "When I saw his concluding words, I
recognized at once that the dispatch I had sent him had been helpful…I
am quite sure Churchill prepared that part of his speech, which was the
climax, in the light of what I sent him …"
The entrance of America into the war
evolved through many steps, from Lend-Lease - supplying Allies with
weapons, ships and tanks -- to the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Churchill's continued wooing of Roosevelt
became first-hand and the "special relationship" no longer
required a Canadian intermediary. America eventually eclipsed all of its
Allies but this in no way diminished the significance of Canada's
contribution to the war effort. Canada's industrial and military
contribution, on a per capita basis, was second to none.
The great military victories in Italy,
France, Holland, Germany and the Far East might not have been possible
had not Canadian leaders provided the essential linchpin in those
dramatic days at the beginning of the war - days when Canada was deemed
a best friend by both Great Britain and the United States.
With so much in common, so much at stake,
it is little wonder that in 2005 Canada's then-ambassador to the U.S.,
Frank McKenna, publicly chastised Canadians to stop being so
self-righteous toward America and its policies and its President.
Granted, one cannot compare today's trade
disputes with the peril of World War II, but perhaps it is time for
Britain, in a small and meaningful way, to return the favour to Canada
and have Tony Blair, "America's best friend", act as a
linchpin to assist McKenna, his U.S. counterpart, David Wilkins, and
their political bosses in restoring harmonious relations between Canada
and the U.S.
